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ABSTRACT 
 
Managed care generally, and more specifically, 
accountable care organizations (ACOs) have 
attempted to provide coordination of patient care in 
order to eliminate or reduce unnecessary procedures 
and or test redundancy.  The purpose of this research 
was to study the effects of managed care in 
accountable care organizations by decreasing health 
care costs by increasing efficiency in health care.   
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1 INTRODUCTION 
According to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
(CMS), in 2011 health care spending in the U.S. was 
$2.7 trillion, or 17.9% of Gross Domestic Product, 
and between 2009 and 2011 this spending increased 
at 3.9% annually (CMS, 2012).  One of the proposed 
ideas to assist in resolving this problem has been 
Managed Care (MC) via Accountable Care 
Organizations (ACOs.   
 
 
Managed care was the idea of creating coordination 
of care in an attempt to control costs in health care 
spending.  The primary care physician in MC was 
placed as the major point of control in terms of 
monitoring utilization throughout the system; i.e., the 
“gatekeeper” (Mains, Coustasse and Lykens, 2003).  
The simple idea of an ACO was to formulate a unit 
consisting of a local health care organization and/or a 
related set of clinicians that take responsibility for 
both the cost and quality of care rendered to a defined 
population (Schoen et al., 2009). 
 
 
The use of ACOs has been attempted to provide the 
coordination of patient care to eliminate or reduce 
unnecessary procedures and/or test redundancy.  
ACOs have aimed to distribute payment to providers 
based on the quality of rendered care and not on the 
incentive of Fee For Service (FFS), which has been 
the model often used for payment (Correia, 2011). 
 
 
Capitation is one of the methods in which ACOs have 
been attempting to introduce cost containment 
through the concept of a “per member per month” 
(PMPM) being implemented as a set rate.  In 
allowing the reversal of the traditional financial 
incentives for providers created by health insurance 
companies, capitation has been an influential force 
for cost containment (Hall, Ellman and Orentlicher, 
2011).  
 
 
2 METHODOLOGY 
 
 
The primary hypothesis of this study was that 
Primary Care Provider(s) (PCP) will decrease health 
care expenditures through memberships in ACOs.  
The secondary hypothesis was: MOCs will curb 
overspending through utilization reviews and in 
having a PCP as the gatekeeper. 
 
 
This study consisted of a literature review of full text 
articles cited on CINAHL, PubMed and EbscoHost.  
Google was utilized when articles could not be 
located through the previously noted databases.  Key 
words used in the search included ‘ACO’ AND 
‘PCP’, OR ‘cost’, OR ‘MC’, OR ‘utilization review’.  
The Kaiser Family Foundation and The New England 
Journal of Medicine websites; recent textbooks were 
also utilized.  The search was limited to articles 
published in English from 2000 to June 2013.  
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Primary and secondary data were included from 
articles, websites, and textbooks.  Relevant articles 
were selected after the review of abstracts was 
performed.  Following the literature search, all 
references were independently screened by two 
reviewers to identify all citations as meeting 
inclusion criteria. 
 
 
3 RESULTS 
 
 
Hospitals Employment Strategy   
 
 
In response to implementing health care reform, US 
hospitals have been increasing the hiring of 
physicians as a key to preparing expected Medicare 
payment reforms which has included bundled 
payments, ACOs, and penalties for preventable 
hospital readmissions (Goldsmith, 2011).  Initially 
hospitals moved to employ physicians focusing on 
specialists to form specific service lines, by doing so 
increasing hiring of PCPs has lead to referrals for the 
hospitals employed specialists (O’Malley, Bond and 
Berenson, 2011). 
 
 
Since new physicians today have been more inclined 
to value better work-life equivalence, physicians have 
been more willing to trade higher incomes for the 
lifestyles that are provided by hospital employment 
(Higgins et al., 2011).  Kocher and Sahni (2011) note 
a 75% increase in the number of active doctors 
employed by hospitals since 2000; in turn, 
percentages of US physician practices owned by 
physicians have decreased from 70% in 2002 to 48% 
in 2008, while the number of hospital-owned 
practices have increased from 23% in 2002 to 53% in 
2008. More physicians have become employed by 
hospitals, and as this has been happening, hospitals 
have been able to reduce excess costs associated with 
inessential practice alteration and expensive supplies 
selected by physicians that have not been essential 
(Kocher and Sahni, 2011).  
 
 
Hospital employment has been attractive to 
beginning practice physicians because of the 
perceived financial security and work-life balance; 
hospitals have been achieving this by gaining higher 
rates to offer better compensation than independent 
physicians could get on their own (O’Malley, Bond 
and Berenson, 2011).  It has been uncertain whether 
the benefits of improved care coordination, few 
complications, and bottom dollar savings through 
ACO-type organizations, that have assimilated 
physicians and hospitals, have been passed along to 
patients as decreased prices (Kocher and Sahni, 
2011).  Under volume-driven Fee For Service (FFS), 
physician employment has been appealing to both 
hospitals and physicians; although this trend has 
grown it does not guarantee improved clinical 
integration (O’Malley, Bond and Berenson, 2011).   
 
 
Partnerships between Insurers and Providers 
 
 
Various organizations have formed ACOs to serve 
Medicare and commercial consumers with the 
agreement of certain terms including of meeting 
certain quality and outcome standards when 
rendering care to a group of patients.  If both partners 
attain a savings greater than a certain percentage 
compared with what would have been spent for the 
same patients in a FFS model, the insurance company 
rewards both partners with a share of the savings 
(Beraducci, Langheim and Vars, 2012).  
 
 
Several providers have teamed up with insurers to set 
up commercial, non-Medicare ACOs.  One such 
ACO, AdvocateCare, was created in 2012 as an 
association between Blue Cross Blue Shield of 
Illinois and Advocate Health Care of Chicago.  After 
six months of providing care to 750,000 members, 
some successful utilization results were obtained.  
During the first six months of 2011, hospital 
admissions decreased 10.6% and emergency 
department visits by 5.4% in comparison to the same 
time frame of the previous year (Berarducci, 
Langheim and Vars, 2012). 
 
Payment Methods and Financial Incentives 
 
 
Two very different payment methods to support 
ACOs, a Shared Savings Program (SSP) and partial 
capitation referred to as Population-Based Payment 
(PBP), have been implemented (Lieberman and 
Bertko, 2001).  
 
 
Under the basic SSP concept, providers are paid on a 
FFS basis.  Yet, Medicare has been responsible for 
determining the expected total expenditures for 
patients cared for by the ACO as well as measuring 
and assessing the quality of care (Berwick, 2011).  
The ACO awards a bonus if quality care was 
provided for less than predicted by Medicare.  The 
possibility of an ACO achieving a bonus was 
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determined by spending targets; a critical issue 
achieved through various configurations.  Many 
ACOs have found the SSP payment attractive since 
bonuses have been implemented on a shared savings 
approach, which did not involve any financial risk 
taking activity (Berwick, 2011).  A disadvantage of 
the SSP payment method for ACOs has been the FFS 
incentive of “do more, get paid more” (Lieberman 
and Bertko, 2011).  ACOs have been more likely to 
not participate in advanced treatment and care 
services that were not funded by the FFS system 
since the ACO would have to directly fund these 
services without the guarantee of being financially 
rewarded (Rosenthal, Cutler and Feder, 2011).  
Although the FFS system is not perfect, many have 
thought the likelihood of a generous bonus to the 
ACO for achieving overall savings could achieve 
different referral patterns so that care is conveyed to 
the clinicians who make valuable use of resources 
(Rosenthal, Cutler and Feder, 2011).   
 
 
Alternatively, the partial capitation or PBP system 
prepays a provider a predetermined amount for 
services to a specific group of people for a fixed 
period.  With the PBP payment method, providers 
have to consider all resources needed to care for the 
patients for whom they are responsible, which 
involves a greater financial risk (Rosenthal, Cutler 
and Feder, 2011).  The partial capitation has had 
many advantages over the SSP payment method 
making it more attractive to this organization.  ACOs 
and affiliated providers have had more incentive and 
flexibility to implement advanced treatment and care 
services not funded in the FFS system (Lieberman 
and Bertko, 2011).  ACOs also receive payment 
upfront, which better allows for capital and other 
investments.  The payment incentives have differed 
with partial capitation with the hospital being a “cost 
center”; conversely, with a SSP, the hospitals have 
been an accounting “profit center” for an ACO 
(DeVore and Champion, 2011).  There has not just 
been incentive for the ACOs to cut total costs, but 
continuously maintain the improvements.   Overall, 
the SSP has not limited patient choice in providers or 
required financial risks for providers (Lieberman and 
Bertko, 2011).     
 
 
4 CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
MC evolved and shows some promising results 
through the introduction of ACOs.  The Affordable 
Care Act (ACA) has encouraged the use of MC 
through ACOs to help reduce health care spending in 
the US.  If an ACO achieved improved care while the 
cost of providing that decreased, it shared in the 
savings it achieved for Medicare (Berwick, 2011).  
The majority of the information that was once 
theoretical in nature has been producing long-term 
outcomes in reducing health care spending.  
Berarducci, Langheim and Vars (2012) found success 
with partnerships between insurers and providers 
after setting up AdvocateCare, which provided care 
to 750,000 members. During the first six months of 
2011, hospital admissions were decreased to 10.6% 
and emergency department visits were down 5.4% in 
comparison to the same timeframe of the year 2010. 
 
 
However, one has seen the projected effects of future 
outcomes with MC having been around for a few 
decades.  Concepts such as capitation to replace FFS 
have never been fully recognized because of the 
reduced monetary income this had caused with PCPs 
in the past.  Capitation alone has been used by MC 
organizations to regulate increased spending in health 
care since the 1990’s (Frakt and Mayes, 2012).  The 
thought has been to try a hybrid of capitation and 
FFS, along with UR to lower health care costs while 
increasing quality. 
 
 
PCPs have had the ability to help lower health care 
spending with more thorough preventative care 
measures that have been implemented under the 
ACA, which provides 100% coverage for all 
preventative services. Since the focus of health care 
has been geared toward preventative care versus 
disease treatment, the effect has lowered costs in 
health care spending.  Education has been indicated 
to assist in decreased spending and assisted in 
lowered costs. Patients who have an understanding of 
the system have utilized their PCP to help them make 
informed decisions.  However, ultimately the 
responsibility lies with the PCP to assist consumers 
to make informed decisions that may help curb over-
spending (O’Malley, Bond and Berenson, 2011) 
concluded that by US hospitals increasing the hiring 
of physicians is a key to expected Medicare payment 
reforms.  Subsequently there has been an increase in 
the number of physicians employed by hospitals, 
although it is unclear whether ACO-type 
organizations that have incorporated physicians and 
hospitals have actually decreased prices on a patient 
level (Kocher and Sahni, 2011).   
 
 
Two payment methods that support ACOs included 
SSP and PBP. Under the SSP concept, incentives 
were used in that if the ACO provided quality care 
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for less than predicted, a bonus was awarded. A 
disadvantage of the SSP payment method for ACOs 
has been the FFS incentive of “do more, get paid 
more” (Lieberman and Bertko, 2011).  Alternatively, 
the PBP system has prepaid the provider a 
predetermined amount for a fixed amount of time to a 
specific group.  This payment method has shown to 
be a greater financial risk than the SSP concept.  
Consequently, ACOs have not been a huge game 
changer in the short run of bending the cost curve and 
improving quality of care, but have been definitely 
worth a shot given the history of problems with the 
FFS (Devers and Berenson, 2011). 
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